Dead Men\u27s Lawyers Tell No Tales: The Attorney-Client Privilege Survives Death by Kramer, Jon J.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 89
Issue 3 Spring Article 5
Spring 1999
Dead Men's Lawyers Tell No Tales: The Attorney-
Client Privilege Survives Death
Jon J. Kramer
Northwestern University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Jon J. Kramer, Dead Men's Lawyers Tell No Tales: The Attorney-Client Privilege Survives Death, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 941
(1998-1999)
0091-4169/99/8903-0941
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 89, No. 3
Copyright 0 1999 by Northwstcrn Univcrsity, School of Law Pritu in U.&A.
DEAD MEN'S LAWYERS TELL NO TALES:
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
SURVIVES DEATH
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Swidler & Berlin v. United States,' the United States Su-
preme Court held that there is no posthumous exception to the
attorney-client privilege for communications with substantial
impact on criminal proceedings. In reaching its principal hold-
ing, the Court explicitly rejected the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit's balancing test.2 The Court of Appeals had recommended
that judges balance clients' interests in posthumous confidenti-
ality against the need for evidence in criminal proceedings to
determine whether communications between attorneys and cli-
ents may be introduced as evidence after clients have died.3
The Supreme Court reasoned that preservation of the privi-
lege after death would be consistent with clients' best interests.
Survival of the privilege would therefore encourage the kind of
open and frank communication between client and counsel
which the privilege was intended to achieve.4 Citing deceased
clients' concerns about reputation, civil liability, and potential
harm to friends and family,5 the Court noted that posthumous
disclosure of confidential communications even in a limited
criminal context might result in less communication between
attorneys and clients.6 Finding that earlier exceptions to the at-
torney-client privilege did not justify a posthumous exception in
'118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
2 Id. at 2086.
'In reSealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub non. Swidler & Ber-
lin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
4 SWidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2085.
6 Id at 2085-86.
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this case, the Supreme Court rejected use of a balancing test to
determine application of the privilege because such a test might
result in disclosure of information inconsistent with clients' best
interests.7 However, the Court noted that its decision did not
reach the question of whether the posthumous attorney-client
privilege must be preserved in cases where criminal defendants'
constitutional rights might be implicated.8
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision to pre-
serve the attorney-client privilege in Swidler & Berlin v. United
States is correct because its focus on clients' interests is consis-
tent with the rationale underlying the development of the privi-
lege. This Note begins by tracing the history of the attorney-
client privilege, explaining how and why exceptions to the privi-
lege developed over time. This Note then examines the reason-
ing of both the majority and minority opinions in the case.
Next, this Note argues that the Supreme Court's failure to rec-
ognize an exception to the posthumous privilege for testimony
having a substantial impact on criminal proceedings is consis-
tent with earlier courts' attention to clients' interests when de-
termining the contours of the privilege. Finally, this Note
concludes that the Court's refusal to address the potential con-
flict between the posthumous attorney-client privilege and de-
fendants' constitutional rights should not be interpreted as a
sign of the Court's willingness to recognize an additional excep-
tion to the posthumous privilege.
Il. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege dates back to the English
Common Law of the late sixteenth century making it the first
privilege the law recognized for confidential communication.9
7 Id at 2087.
8 Id. at 2086 n.3.
'8 JOHN HENRYWIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed.,
1961). See also Dennis v. Codrington, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (1580) (finding "A counsellor
not to be examined of any matter, wherein he hath been of counsel"); Berd v. Love-
lace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577) (holding "solicitor exempted from examination
touching the cause").
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The Supreme Court of the United States embraced the privilege
early in its tenure, finding that "[t]he general rule is not dis-
puted, that confidential communications between client and at-
torney, are not to be revealed at any time."10  Though legal
historians have not questioned the early existence of the privi-
lege, the reasons underlying the privilege's development have
been the subject of some debate.11 This controversy is signifi-
cant since the contours of the attorney-client privilege are
largely determined by the importance of the policy goals which
underlie it, and the extent to which the privilege is viewed to
further those ends. 2
The original rationale for the privilege concerned the pro-
tection of attorneys' honor as gentlemen. The conventions of
the time considered disclosure of confidential communications
dishonorable. However, this doctrine gradually eroded be-
cause "the judicial search for truth could not endure to be ob-
structed by a voluntary pledge of secrecy, nor was there any
moral delinquency or public odium in breaking one's pledge
under force of law." 5 In its place arose the modern rationale,
which reasons that allowing communication without fear of dis-
16
closure encourages clients to be honest with their attorneys.
'0 Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826).
"See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client PFivilege, 66
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978) (contending that the legal interests and theories un-
derlying the development of the privilege were not as clear as Dean Wigmore, the
noted commentator on the law of evidence, presents). See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.2, at 242-43 (1986) (discussing reasons for development
of privilege). Dean Wigmore to some extent acknowledges the early confusion, as he
observes, "Probably in no rule of evidence having so early an origin were so many
points still unsettled until the middle of the 1800's." 8 WGMORE, supra note 9, § 2290,
at 544.
'2 See infra Part II. B.
s See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2290, at 543 (citing Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng.
Rep. 401, 406 (L.J.C.P. 1836) ("The first duty of an attorney... is to keep the secrets
of his clients.")).
"See id
"' Id. at 545. Though Wigmore explains the goal of the privilege as being "free-
dom of consultation," the English cases he cites for the premise exhibit an evolving
rationale for the importance of the freedom. See, e.g., Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17
How. St. Tr. 1139, 1225, 1241 (Ex. 1743) (explaining agency rationale; the increasing
complexity of business enterprises made it necessary that there should be people
1999]
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This view was embraced by the Supreme Court in 1981 in Up-
john Co. v. United States, in which the Court found that the privi-
lege was intended to encourage "full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and the ad-
ministration of justice.' 7  Fear of disclosure would discourage
clients from communicating openly and honestly with their at-
torneys.18 To encourage candor between clients and their coun-
sel, protection of the rights and interests of clients became the
guiding principle used to determine the parameters of the at-
torney-client privilege.19
However, courts have recognized the tension resulting from
20
the privilege's tendency to frustrate the fact-finding process.
Implicit in courts' recognition of the privilege has been a con-
sensus that the "social good derived from the proper perform-
ance of the function of lawyers acting for their clients .
outweighs [s] the harm that may come from the suppression of
evidence., 2' This statement represents a conclusion by the legal
whose job it was to represent the legal interests of owners). See also Anderson v. Bank,
2 Ch. D. 644, 649 (Ch. App. 1876) (explaining fairness rationale; the complexity and
difficulty of law itself necessitates the involvement of trained professionals to conduct
litigation). It could be argued that this formulation also implies a kind of "legitimacy
rationale" as well. The ability of individuals to seek assistance from attorneys versed
in the law (without fear of disclosure) acts to promote confidence in and acceptance
of a system ofjustice whose procedures the majority of citizens do not fully compre-
hend.
17449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
'8 See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (legal "assistance can only be
safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of
disclosure"). See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
19 See Hamilton v. Neel, 7 Watts 517, 521 (Pa. 1838) ("But where it is impossible,
that the rights or the interests of the client can be affected by the witness's giving evi-
dence of what came to his knowledge by his having been counsel and acted at the
time as attorney or counsel at law, the rule has no application whatever, because the
reason of it does not exist.").
0 See In re GrandJury Investigation, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983) (Because "the
attorney client privilege may serve as a mechanism to frustrate the investigative or
fact-finding process, it creates an inherent tension with society's need for full and
complete disclosure of all relevant evidence during implementation of the judicial
process."). See also Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. 89, 97 (1831) ("The rule of privilege, hav-
ing a tendency to prevent the full disclosure of the truth, ought to be construed
strictly.").
2" Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1029 (Mass. 1985) (quoting
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)).
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system that the systemic benefit which accrues from enhanced
attorney-client communications outweighs the loss of evidence
protected by the privilege. This understanding has guided the
development of the attorney-client privilege, and courts have
only recognized exceptions to the privilege when its application
would be at odds with its underlying policy goals.
B. NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
1. Testamentary Exception
The testamentary exception allows suspension of the attor-
ney-client privilege after the death of the client, when necessary
to resolve disputes between litigants claiming under the dece-
dent's estate. 3 The rationale underlying the exception was first
explained in 1851 in Russell v. Jackson.24 The English court con-
cluded that when all the parties to a dispute "claim under the
client," suspending the privilege would prove consistent with a
client's interest in the rightful disposition of his estate.,5 In rec-
ognizing the testamentary exception, courts have examined the
extent to which it furthers the goals the privilege is intended to
achieve. 26 By the end of the nineteenth century, the testamen-
tary exception had been embraced by the Supreme Court in
Glover v. Patten.27 In Glover, the daughters of the decedent dis-
"See Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Limitations on the attor-
ney-client privilege have therefore been drawn narrowly, to remove the privilege only
where the privileged relationship is abused. Absent such abuse, or a waiver of the
privilege, our legal system jealously protects the confidential status of attorney-client
communications.").
2MIcHAEL A. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 503.1, at 522 (4th ed.
1996).
" 68 Eng. Rep. 558 (V.C. 1851). A deceased client's next of kin sued the estate af-
ter he was excluded from the will. Id. The plaintiff demanded that the deceased's at-
torney be forced to testify. Id
"Id. at 560. The court was willing to apply an exception to the privilege, reason-
ing that the client impliedly waives the right in order to fulfill his or her testamentary
intent. I&
"See Blackburn v. Crawfords, 70 U.S. 175, 194 (1865) (-A different result would in-
volve a perversion of the rule, inconsistent with its object, and in direct conflict with
the reasons upon which it was founded.").
"165 U.S. 394, 406 (1897) ("[W]e are of the opinion that, in a suit between devi-
sees under a will, statements made by the deceased to counsel respecting the execu-
tion of the will, or other similar document, are not privileged.").
1999] 945
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agreed on the proper interpretation of their mother's will.
The Court found that in a suit between heirs to an estate, com-
munications between the decedent and her attorney would not
be privileged since proper disposition of the estate was in the
decedent's best interest.2 It is notable that even as courts began
to recognize this exception to the privilege, they seemingly ig-
nored possible cases in which post-death disclosure would not
be consistent with clients' intent." Commentators have recog-
nized the potential chilling effect of the exception on commu-
nication between attorneys and clients in testamentary matters."
2. Crime/Fraud Exception
Attorney-client communications are not privileged if they
are intended to assist or promote future or ongoing criminal
conduct. 2 This exception is older than the testamentary excep-
tion, dating back to English jurisprudence of the eighteenth
century. 3 The "exception" designation may be a bit misleading,
28 at 394-97.
Id. at 406.
The example of an illegitimate child discussed in Blackburn suggests an instance
in which a testator may prefer that his communications remain confidential even if
his attorney's silence would frustrate his testamentary intent. Blackburn, 70 U.S. at
193. This point is raised by the dissent in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
2081, 2089 (1998) (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
" See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nora. Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998); CHARLESW. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETmIcs § 6.3.4, at 256 (1986) (Attorney-client testamentary discussions are "the one
occasion above all others when a client is likely to be moved to silence in conversa-
tions with a lawyer if the client becomes aware that disclosure can be made after the
client's death."); Simon J. Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege after the Death of the Cli-
ent, 6 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 77 (1992); George W. Overton, Ruling on Attorney-Client
Privilege a Fascinating Exerdcre CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETiN, June 29, 1998, at 2 (dis-
cussing situations in which clients may not want heirs to have access to privileged
communications).
12 See In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986) ("All reasons for
the attorney-client privilege are completely eviscerated when a client consults an at-
torney not for advice on past misconduct, but for legal assistance in carrying out a
contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud."). See also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1, 15 (1933) ("The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults
an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no
help from the law.").
3See 8 WiGMORE, supra note 9, § 2298, at 575-76 (quoting Annesley v. Earl of An-
glesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1129, 1229, 1232, 1241-42 (Ex. 1743) ("If he is employed as an
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as there really is no presumption of privilege for this type of
communication. The rationale for the "exception" is that attor-
ney-client communications which further criminal or tortious
activity do not fit within the scope of the proper attorney-client
relationship, and therefore merit no privilege.34 However, Dean
Wigmore has observed the ironic nature of the exception's ra-
tionale, since attorney-client discussion of past criminal activity
may also serve to further such behavior.!
3. Breach of Duty by Attorney or Client
The law also recognizes an exception to the attorney-client
privilege in cases which involve alleged breeches of duty by cli-
ents or attorneys.s Issues of breach of duty by attorneys or cli-
ents might arise in cases where the attorney is suing to collect a
fee, the client is suing the attorney for legal malpractice, or
third parties are suing an attorney for his or her involvement in
allegedly tortious behavior."" Given that clients may themselves
waive the privilege at will, 40 the apparent rationale for excep-
tions in these types of cases is to protect the interests of attor-
41neys.
attorney in any unlawful or wicked act, his duty to the public obliges him to disclose
it.")).
See id., at 572. See also Erick S. Ottoson, Dead Man Talking. A New Approach to Evi-
dence: The Crime Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege-United States v. Zolin, 109 S.
Ct. 2619 (interim ed. 1989), 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 365, 371 (1990).
m 8 WiGMORE, supra note 9, § 2298, at 572.
36 See GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 503.7, at 551, 552. See also Laughner v. United
States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967) ("The rule that a client waives his privi-
lege by attacking the attorney's performance of his duties seems to have been
adopted unanimously by those courts which have dealt with the question.").
17 See, e.g., Nakasian v. Incontrade, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Mitchell v. Bromberger, 2 Nev. 855 (1866).
'3 See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, §2327, at 638 (citing Olmstead v. Webb, 5 App.
D.C. 38, 51 (1894) (noting that "the object of the rule ceases, and the attorney is no
longer bound by its obligation, when the client or his representatives charge him...
with a fraud, or other improper or unprofessional conduct")).
" See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins., 497 F.2d 1190, 1194-96 (2d.
Cir. 1974) (Attorney for issuer of securities being sued for fraud by purchasers of se-
curities had a right to testify to content of attorney-client communications).
40 See GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 503.7, at 554.
For a critique of these rules, see Henry D. Levine, Self-Interest or Self-Defense: Lawyer




C. HISTORY OF THE POST-MORTEM ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Since its beginnings, the presumption has been that the at-
torney-client privilege continues after death.42  While the Su-
preme Court affirmed the testamentary exception in Glover v.
Patten, it implied that the privilege generally survives the death
of the client.43  Dean Wigmore explained the continuation of
the privilege by noting that "there is no limit of time beyond
which the disclosures might not be used to the detriment of the
client or his estate."4
While preservation of the privilege after clients' death has
been the norm in the majority ofjurisdictions,5 this rule has by
no means been unanimous. California, in drafting its code of
evidence, made a conscious decision to depart from the com-
mon-law tradition, and allow suspension of the privilege after a
client's estate has been closed.46  Rejecting Wigmore's premise
that disclosure will always be detrimental to clients' interests,
California sought to safeguard the financial interests of the cli-
ent by extending the privilege for as long as the deceased cli-
ent's civil liability persists.47
One Pennsylvania appellate court in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab
Co. took a different approach to application of the posthumous
privilege.48 The Cohen court, while acknowledging the presump-
tion of survival for the privilege post-mortem, suggested applica-
tion of a balancing test when there is substantial need for an
42 Hart v. Thompson's Ex'r, 15 La. 88, 93 (1840) (stating that attorney cannot be
compelled to disclose communications of deceased client). See also Chirac v. Re-
inicker, 24 U.S. 280, 294 (1826). See also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2323, at 630.
165 U.S. 394,407 (1897).
44 8 WiGMORE, supra note 9, § 2323, at 630.
"See Frankel, supra note 31, at 78-79.
16 CAL.. CODE EvID. ANN. § 954 Cmt. (West 1998) ("Hence the privilege ceases to ex-
ist when the client's estate is finally distributed and his personal representative is dis-
charged. This is apparently a change in California law.").
47 Id. ("Although there is good reason for maintaining the privilege while the es-
tate is being administered-particularly if the estate is involved in litigation-there is
little reason to preserve secrecy at the expense of excluding relevant evidence after
the estate is wound up and the representative discharged.").
4357 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). In this case, a cab company was being sued
by the victim of a hit-and-run accident. Id The deceased driver of the cab was a de-
fendant in the case. Id. Leaving no estate, the driver could not be financially dam-
aged by disclosure of his admission of guilt to his attorney. Id.
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attorney's testimony. 9 In making its decision to compel the at-
torney's testimony, the court weighed the significance of the
evidence against the "rights, interests, estates, or memory" of
the deceased,50 further noting that when the administration of
justice can only be frustrated by application of the privilege,
trial judges may compel disclosure.51 However, while advocating
use of a balancing test, the court noted that if there is doubt as
to possible injury to a client's interest, the issue is to be resolved
in favor of non-disclosure.
Some commentators have argued for the widespread use of
a more liberal balancing test than that applied in Cohen. The
American Law Institute has proposed the creation of a tribunal
which would "balance [the] interest of confidentiality against
any exceptional need for the communication."5 3 Still other
commentators have argued for the wholesale abandonment of
the privilege after death of the client, contending that there
would be little, if any, effect on client candor. 4
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 19, 1993, close to four months after Bill Clinton
took office as President of the United States, David Watkins, As-
sistant to the President for Management and Administration,
49 Id. at 692-93.
sId.
,Id. at 694.
,Id. This qualification appears to contradict the court's earlier reference to "in-
jury to the client's memory" ai a factor to be considered in the balancing test. Id. at
693. In allowing the deceased client's attorney to testify in this case, the court ac-
knowledged that his testimony would confirm the client's earlier statement as perjury,
but dismissed the implications for the client's memory by noting that an earlier wit-
ness' deposition also contradicted the client's testimony. Id.
"RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127, Comt. d (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996). See also 2 CHRISOPHERB. MEULLER & LAiRD C. KImATRICK,
FEDERALEvIDENCE § 199, at 380 (2d ed. 1994) ("[A] rule requiring occasional disclo-
sure in this setting would not seriously undercut the utilitarian basis of the privi-
lege.").
" CHARLES TiLFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVmENCE § 94, at 350 (John Wil-
liam Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("To hold that in all cases death terminates the privi-
lege . . .could not to any substantial degree lessen the encouragement for free
disclosure which is the purpose of the privilege."). See also 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& KENNEW. GRAHAM, FEDERALPRACCE AND PROCEDURE § 5498, at 484-85 (1986).
1999] 949
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dismissed seven career employees from their positions with the
White House Travel Office.55 The employees were told that they
were being dismissed for mismanaging travel office funds. 6
Two days earlier, accountants from KPMG Peat Marwick had
discovered problems in the Travel Office, noting a shortage of
$18,200 in the petty cash account.57 The Travel Office employ-
ees were subsequently replaced with political appointees, in-
cluding a distant cousin of President Clinton.5 8 In conjunction
with the dismissal, the White House announced that it had
asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate
the former employees' activities. 59
This announcement provoked questions regarding the
White House's reasons for discharging the employees and re-
questing an FBI investigation. 60 On July 2, 1993, the White
House announced the results of its own internal investigation
into the Travel Office firings, subsequently reprimanding four
employees for their involvement in the dismissals.61 Although
Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster was not repri-
manded, he was mentioned as being involved in the firings.62
Controversy concerning the firings persisted, and the President
ordered the General Accounting Office to conduct its own re-
view of the matter.63 On Sunday, July 11, Vincent Foster visited
attorney James Hamilton of the Washington D.C. law firm
Swidler & Berlin, to discuss the possibility of Hamilton repre-
senting Foster and the White House in future investigations of
the Travel Office firings.6 During the meeting, Hamilton took
three pages of notes.r Nine days after his consultation with
's Brief for the United States at 3, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081
(1998) (No. 97-1192).
56 Toni Locy, For Mite House Travel Office, a Two-Year Trip of Trouble, WAS. POST,
Feb. 27, 1995, at A4.
5 id
'Joan Biskupic, Do Legal Secrets Outlive Clients?, WASH. POST, June 8, 1998, at A2.
-9 Brief for the United States at 3, Swidler (No. 97-1192).601d&
61 d.
62 Ide601d.
" Id. at 3-4.6 0Brief for Petitioners at 2, Swidler, (No. 97-1192).
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Hamilton, on July 20, Vincent Foster was found dead.6 Police
concluded that the cause of death was suicide.
On January 3, 1996, the White House announced the dis-
covery of a memorandum which suggested that First Lady Hil-
lary Clinton may have been involved in the Travel Office
firings.r The discovery of the memorandum raised doubts as to
the veracity of Mr. Watkins' (and others') earlier testimony con-
cerning the First Lady's involvement in the firings.69 In March
of 1996, in response to the discovery of the memorandum, At-
torney General Janet Reno requested that the Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel Kenneth Starr expand the scope of its
ongoing investigation of the President to include investigating
whether individuals connected with the White House "made
false statements, committed perjury, obstructed justice, or
committed other crimes during investigations of the Travel Of-
fice matter.,
70
The Office of Independent Counsel then commenced its
own investigation of the Travel Office firings and subsequent
White House behavior.7 In December of 1995, James Hamilton
and Swidler & Berlin received federal grand jury subpoenas for
the notes Hamilton took during his consultation with Vincent
Foster.7 2 Swidler & Berlin moved to quash the subpoenas, con-
tending that both the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine prevented them from surrendering the notes.7 3 The
District Court for the District of Columbia, after reviewing the
document in camera, granted the motion to quash, finding that
the notes were protected by both the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine, but declined to discuss the rea-
soning for its decision.7 4
66 Brief for the United States at 3, Swider (No. 97-1192).
67 Id.
68a
69 Id. at 5.
70 ad






The Office of Independent Counsel appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
which reversed and remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with the holding.75 The Court of Appeals' decision quali-
fied the posthumous privilege, recognizing an exception to the
privilege when the substance of communications bears on a sig-
nificant aspect of criminal proceedings. 76 To determine when
evidence protected by the attorney-client privilege could be ad-
mitted, the court held that a balancing test should be used to
weigh the evidence's impact on pending criminal proceedings
against the deceased client's interest in continued confidential-
ity."
James Hamilton and Swidler & Berlin petitioned the Su-
preme Court for certiorari.78 They argued that the Court of Ap-
peals' decision would significantly discourage clients from
confiding in their attorneys, thereby defeating the basic purpose
of the attorney-client privilege. 79 Hamilton and Swidler & Berlin
further contended that the court erred in its denial of height-
ened work product protection for Hamilton's notes, because at-
torneys exercise professional judgment when deciding which
portions of attorney-client communications should be written
down.8° The Supreme Court granted Hamilton and Swidler &
Berlin's petition for certiorari."' The Supreme Court subse-
quently granted the motion of Independent Counsel to expe-
dite the briefing and argument.
2
SIn re Sealed Case, 124F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Swidler& Berlin v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
76 Id. at 231.
77 The appellate court also found that an attorney's notes from a client inter-
view would not be shielded by the work-product privilege if they included only factual
material. Id at 230.
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084 (1998).
79 Brief for Petitioners at 7, Swidler (No. 97-1192).
Id at 9.
'1Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1358, 1359 (1998).
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1406, 1407 (1998).
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IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, holding that the at-
torney-client privilege survives a client's death even when the
evidence is of substantial importance to a criminal proceeding.3
The Court concluded that use of a balancing test, which
weighed a deceased client's interest in confidentiality against
the need for evidence in a criminal trial, would introduce sub-
stantial uncertainty into the protection afforded by the privi-
legeY Hence, use of such a balancing test would be
inconsistent with the privilege's purpose of encouraging candor
between attorneys and their clients.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 6 began his
analysis by acknowledging the long history of the attorney-client
privilege, as well as its goal of encouraging "full and frank com-
munication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law
and the administration ofjustice."s'
The Court then observed that all but two cases? have held
either expressly or implicitly that the attorney-client privilege
survives the death of the client. 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that even where courts have suspended the privilege post-
mortem, these decisions consistently assume the privilege gen-
erally survives.9° This acknowledgment represented a clear re-
jection of the Independent Counsel's contention that the
Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2082.
u Id. at 2083.
Id. at 2082.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer.
8 Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2084 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389 (1981)).
" Id. (citing Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 693, 694 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1976); In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 236-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Swidler
& Berlin v. United States, 118 S. CL 2081 (1998)).
Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2084.
Id. at 2085. See, e.g., Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 406-08 (1897) (assumed that
privilege persisted after client's death).
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majority of courts have refused to apply the privilege posthu-
mously91 Turning to the testamentary exception, the Court ex-
pressly rejected the Independent Counsel's argument that it
represented a policy decision by courts that the interest in
proper settlement of estates outweighed clients' posthumous
confidentiality concerns."2 Chief Justice Rehnquist found that
there was no balancing of policy goals inherent in the applica-
tion of the testamentary exception since the rationale for the
exception is that it furthers the interests of the deceased client.93
Noting that disclosure in the testamentary context was
deemed consistent with clients' interests, 4 the majority observed
that earlier courts found that an implied waiver existed on the
part of the client to disclose the content of the communication
post-mortem, when the information was necessary for the
proper settlement of the client's estate.95 The Court proceeded
to observe that the Independent Counsel's policy-based argu-
ment for suspending the privilege fails because there is no rea-
son to believe that the disclosure of evidence in posthumous
criminal proceedings would in any way further clients' interests
or intent.96
Next, the majority addressed commentators' arguments that
the posthumous privilege should be suspended when extreme
injustice would result from its application, and disclosure would
not seriously discourage client communication.9 7 The Court ob-
served that even those calling for the privilege's abolishment
post-mortem recognized that such a move would be a departure
from previous caselaw.8 The Court then reviewed reasons for
Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2082 (Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that although many
cases dealing with the posthumous privilege apply the testamentary exception, sur-
vival of the privilege is the prevailing view). Id.
9Id. at 2082, 2085.
9' Id at 2085 (citing United States v. Osburn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1340 n.11 (9th Cir.
1977)).
See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
"Swider, 118 S. Ct. at 2085.
9Id. at 2086.
" Id. (citing 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENcE
§ 199, at 380-81 (2d ed. 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS




maintaining the privilege in the face of such criticism.99 Even
though the fear of posthumous disclosure might be reduced by
limiting an exception to criminal cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that legitimate reasons remained as to why clients may
not want confidences disclosed after death.1 0 Listing concerns
for reputation, civil liability, or possible injury to friends and
family, the Court found that even in the absence of criminal li-
ability, attorneys' clients had legitimate reasons to fear disclo-
sure of their confidences after death.10'
The Court then considered the Independent Counsel's con-
tention that his proposed exception would only discourage at-
torney-client communication by those who intend to perjure
themselves on the witness stand.0 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
fused to accept the Independent Counsel's view'03 that the right
to confidential communication with an attorney was analogous
to one's Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination,
and could be suspended if the client were freed from criminal
liability!" The majority observed that people consult attorneys
for various reasons, many of which do not concern criminal li-
ability, and the many discussions would be chilled even if crimi-
nal liability were not a consideration.'05
After rejecting the Independent Counsel's argument, the
Court went on to reason that even if some evidence is lost by
application of the posthumous privilege, such a "loss" is justified
because absent the privilege, the conversation may not have
taken place at all.1'6
99 I.
101 I
102 Id. The Independent Counsel argued that information obtained from a de-
ceased's attorney could have been accessed had the client lived by calling the client to
testify. See Brief for the United States at 20, Swidler (No. 97-1192). The Independent
Counsel noted that prosecutors can grant a living client immunity to circumvent his
Fifth Amendment right of protection against self-incrimination. IM at 20 n.16.
103
10 Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086.
I (observing that people often consult their attorneys about personal, family,
and business matters).
"0 Id. (citingjaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
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The majority then returned to the Independent Counsel's
argument that a limited exception in criminal cases would not
significantly affect the level of communication between attor-
neys and their clients. 10 7 The Court noted the Independent
Counsel's failure to cite cases which support the proposition
that the privilege should apply differently in civil and criminal
proceedings. 18 The majority found that clients' inability to de-
termine whether information might be significant to later
criminal proceedings would introduce "substantial uncertainty
into the privilege's application," thereby discouraging full and
frank communication between clients and attomeys. 1°9
Having rejected a balancing test which would compel testi-
mony with a substantial impact on criminal cases,"0 the majority
then limited the scope of its holding by forbidding extension of
its decision to cases in which criminal defendants' constitutional
rights might justify suspending the privilege.' The Court re-
frained from elaborating on how or which constitutional rights
might warrant suspension of the attorney-client privilege, but
did acknowledge Swidler & Berlin's admission that such a right
might exist.12 In its third footnote,"' the Court appeared to
embrace Swidler & Berlin's contention that it could rule on the
posthumous attorney-client privilege generally without touching
the issue of whether a defendant's "constitutional right to ob-
tain and use as evidence otherwise privileged exonerating
statements" might be sufficient to justify suspension of the privi-
lege. 4
The Court then considered whether an additional excep-
tion would affect clients' willingness to confide information in
their attorneys in light of existing exceptions to the privilege."
The majority responded first by observing that unlike the Inde-




.. Id. at 2086 n.3.
113 Id
"4 Brief for Petitioners at 29, Swidler (No. 97-1192).
110 Swider, 118 S. Ct. at 2087.
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pendent Counsel's proposed exception, existing exceptions to
the privilege were consistent with the purpose of the privilege."6
Chief Justice Rehnquist then noted the Independent Counsel's
inability to present empirical evidence to support his assertion
that an additional exception would not significantly affect at-
torney-client candor."
7
Finally, the Court examined the line of cases which urge
that evidentiary privileges be interpreted narrowly because of
their inconsistency with "the paramount judicial goal of truth
seeking.""8 The majority differentiated these holdings from
Swidler, finding that they dealt with newly created privileges, not
well-established ones like that between attorneys and clients." 9
The Court concluded its analysis by finding that the Independ-
ent Counsel was unable to show that reason and experience jus-
tified a departure from the common law rule that the attorney-
client privilege survives clients' death.2
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT
Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent, 2' did not dispute
the general presumption that the attorney-client privilege sur-
vives the death of the client, but found instead that preservation
of the privilege post-mortem was by no means inevitable.' The
dissent would have compelled the testimony of attorneys of de-
ceased clients when defendants claimed a right to exculpatory
evidence or law enforcement officers demonstrated a compel-
ling need for such information.
25
The dissent began its analysis by citing the principle that
evaluation of evidentiary rules must be based on their ability to
' Id Existing exceptions were found to be consistent with the goal of protecting
clients' interest.
117 id.
'18 Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
Id. at 2087-88.
"'Id. at 2088.
.JoiningJustice O'Connor's opinion were justices Scalia and Thomas.
"' Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2088 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
'" Id. (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
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contribute to discovery of the truth.24 The dissent then asserted
that evidentiary privileges in litigation should be construed nar-
rowly since they hamper the fact-finding process12s Justice
O'Connor contended that even existing privileges should be in-
terpreted narrowly unless they further a "public good transcend-
ing the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational
means for ascertaining [the] truth."
126
Justice O'Connor next observed that although deceased cli-
ents' personal, reputational, or economic concerns might evi-
dence a continued interest in confidentiality, deceased clients'
criminal liability has disappeared entirely and the potential for
harm to other interests has greatly diminished.2 7 She then as-
serted that preservation of the privilege post-mortem would in-
evitably reduce the evidence available in criminal proceedings,
since a client's death prevents prosecutors from accessing the
information by immunizing the witness from prosecution.1
Justice O'Connor then considered the alleged high cost of
maintaining an absolute post-mortem privilege.129 Citing cases
in which deceased clients had confessed crimes for which living
defendants were being tried,30 the dissent argued that the
paramount importance the justice system puts on avoiding the
prosecution of innocent defendants1 31 should outweigh the di-
minished interest deceased clients have in maintaining confi-
dentiality.1 32  Acknowledging that Swidler & Berlin did not
dispute the potential need for an exception for exculpatory evi-
dence, Justice O'Connor proceeded to argue that if an excep-
124 Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381
(1933)).
' I (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (citingjaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996)).
'2 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
50 (1980)).
'2 Id at 2088-89 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
" Id. at 2089 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
'"Id. (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
"Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation,
562 N.E.2d 69, 72 (Mass. 1990); State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz.
1976)).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-25
(1995); In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970)).
2 Id. (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
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tion was warranted to protect the innocent, then it was also justi-
fied to prosecute the guilty, since these are the twin goals of the
criminal justice system.13 The dissent agreed with the lower
court's recommendation of a balancing test which would allow
courts to suspend the privilege where "interests in fairness and
accuracy outweigh the justifications for the privilege.
" '34
The dissent next considered other exceptions to the attor-
ney-client privilege, concluding that existing exceptions to the
privilege prevent clients from being certain that privileged con-
versations will always remain confidential.3 5 Addressing the tes-
tamentary exception, Justice O'Connor reasoned that some
deceased clients might prefer to have confidences preserved,
even at the cost of misallocation of the client's estate.3 6 There-
fore, application of the exception might not always be in the cli-
ent's best interest. 37 Justice O'Connor then took issue with the
contention that exceptions for crime or fraud and claims con-
cerning breach of duty by attorney or client are consistent with
either clients' best interests or the justice system's interest in
promoting candor between clients and their attorneys.ss She
contended that these exceptions to the privilege represent a
recognition that in some instances the attorney-client privilege
ceases to protect the legitimate interests of the criminal justice
system, and therefore should not be preserved. 39
Finally, the dissent surveyed the common law authority for
maintaining the posthumous privilege. It found that most
courts merely presume the privilege persists, but fail to address
the question directly or provide much reasoning for their con-
clusions.40 Justice O'Connor found that existing authority sup-
Id- (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
Id (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
Io (0' Connor, J., dissenting) (citing In Re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 235 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998)).
Id (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
Id- (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing example in which testator may prefer
confidentiality to disclosure of his desire to provide for an illegitimate child and cit-
ing In Re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 234).





ported the proposition that the attorney-client privilege might
be abrogated after the death of clients. She embraced the rea-
soning of California's Evidence Code, finding "there is little rea-
son to preserve secrecy at the expense of excluding relevant
evidence after the estate is wound up and the representative is
discharged.'
4 1
The dissent concluded by citing the work of legal commen-
tators who agree that the posthumous privilege should not be
preserved when such evidence would be instrumental in exon-
erating the innocent or convicting the guilty.
42
V. ANALYSIS
In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 1 the Supreme Court re-
jected use of a balancing test to determine the contours of the
posthumous attorney-client privilege, because it would be in-
consistent with the interests of clients and therefore discourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and clients.'"
This Note argues that even though the Majority did not ade-
quately reconcile its decision with other common law excep-
tions to the privilege, the Court was correct in adhering to the
common law and striking down use of a balancing test. This
Note further argues that by failing to rule on whether criminal
defendants' constitutional rights might warrant breaching the
attorney-client privilege,'45 the Court essentially avoided the In-
dependent Counsel's most compelling argument,
4 6 and missed
an opportunity to clarify defendants' rights under the Sixth
Amendment Compulsory Process Clause. 47  However, the
Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. CODE EvID. ANN. § 952, 954 (West
1995)).
" Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EvIDENCE § 199, at 380-81 (2d ed. 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OFThE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 127, Comt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
'43 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
4 Id. at 2086.
' Id. at 2087 n.3. The possibility that defendants' constitutional rights might war-
rant breaching the privilege in the post-mortem context is granted by Swidler & Ber-
lin. See Brief for Petitioners at 28-29, Swidler (No. 97-1192).
141 See Brief for the United States, at 22-26, Swidler (No. 97-1192).
47 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment states:
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Court's refusal to address this question should not be inter-
preted as willingness to recognize an additional exception to the
privilege. To recognize an exception to the privilege for crimi-
nal defendants' evidentiary needs would be inconsistent with
previous courts' treatment of both the attorney-client privilege
and the right to compulsory process.
A. PROTECTION OF CLIENTS' BEST INTERESTS AS RATIONALE FOR
THE PRIVILEGE
In reaching its decision, the Swidler Court noted that exist-
ing exceptions to the attorney-client privilege are consistent
with the goals of promoting full and frank communication and
safeguarding clients' best interests .' The dissent in Swidler dis-
agreed, noting that the testamentary exception might be ap-
plied even when a deceased client would have preferred that
confidentiality be maintained. 9  Even though efforts may be
made to prevent disclosure of potentially embarrassing details,
the possibility remains that information that clients would have
wished to remain confidential will be disclosed.
While the dissent is correct that application of the testamen-
tary exception will not always be consistent with the preferences
of individual clients, the existence of the testamentary exception
does not represent a "settled policy judgment that the interest
in accurately settling estates overrides any interest in posthu-
mous confidentiality of attorney-client communications."''5
Rather than a policy decision weighing settlement of estates
against confidentiality, the testamentary exception represents a
recognition by courts that, overall, clients prefer that their es-
tates be settled consistently with their wishes, even if it means
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense.
,8 Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086.
'49 Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"o Brief for the United States at 20, Swider (No. 97-1192).
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that unwanted details are disclosed.1 51 In applying the testamen-
tary exception, courts are not so much making a decision
against the best interests of clients, as they are determining what
the majority of attorneys' deceased clients would prefer if they
could still speak. Furthermore, to the extent that clients are no-
tified of the testamentary exception when making out their
wills, the exception serves as an incentive to make their prefer-
ences clear. In this manner, testators exercise a degree of con-
trol over when the testamentary exception will be applied.
The dissent cites the crime/fraud exception and exceptions
for claims relating to breach of duty by attorney or client as fur-
ther proof that courts have already limited the privilege in cases
where its application would not further justice.5 Here the dis-
sent offers a cursory analysis of a complicated issue. As noted
earlier, 153 the "crime-fraud exception" to the attorney-client
privilege is not an exception at all, but a recognition that some
communications are outside the scope of the proper attorney-
client relationship. Regarding the exception for breach of duty
by attorney or client, while in individual instances the excep-
tion's application may not be in the best interest of the client, its
overall impact assists clients by making counsel available to
them.5 It would have been difficult and in poor taste for the
Independent Counsel to argue that disclosure of Hamilton's
notes would be consistent with Vincent Foster's best interests,
given the presumption that the problems which prompted Fos-
ter to consult with Hamilton also contributed to his decision to
commit suicide. Moreover, these exceptions do not present
the same problem of uncertainty for clients, since clients con-
"' See Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 407-08 (1897) (citing Blackburn v. Crawfords,
3 Wall. 175, 194 (1865) ("It could have been no clearer if the client had expressly en-
joined it upon the attorney to give this testimony whenever the truth of his testamen-
tary declaration should be challenged by any of those to whom it related.")).
112 SWider, 118 S. Ct. at 2090 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
If the attorney-client privilege could not be suspended in actions for malpractice
and collection of fees, attorneys would be left entirely at the mercy of their clients,
which would likely make obtaining legal assistance either impossible, or at the very
least, considerably more expensive.
"' See generally Brief for the United States, Swidler (No. 97-1192).
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trol the circumstances under which the privilege might cease."6
The Independent Counsel's proposed exception makes post-
humous disclosure subject to an ex-post balancing test to be ap-
plied by courts on a case-by-case basis. This would make it
almost impossible for clients to determine with certainty
whether or not their communications might be used as evi-
dence in a later criminal proceeding.
The Supreme Court's decision in Swidler strengthened pro-
tection of client interest as a guiding principle in determining
the contours of the attorney-client privilege. 57 Oddly, the case
which the Independent Counsel cited as the only one setting
forth analysis concerning the privilege's survival in the face of
compelling evidentiary need 158 concludes by observing that
when doubt exists as to possible impact on clients' interests, the
presumption should be in favor of nondisclosure. 9 Rather
than advocating the balancing of needs for evidence against cli-
ent interests, Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab holds that the posthumous
privilege should only be curtailed when clients' rights or inter-
ests can not be harmed in any way.160
Moreover, the Cohen court's analysis of client interest ap-
pears flawed. It finds that there was nothing in the attorney's
testimony which would "blacken the memory" of the client,
while acknowledging that the testimony would confirm that the
client committed perjury before he died.16 1 To reconcile these
two contentions, clients would have to care little about their
"'6 Whether or not these exceptions will be applied to privileged communications
is more or less within the control of the client. If a client limits his communication to
non-testamentary matters, avoids discussing future criminal activity, pays the attor-
ney's fees, and does not sue his attorney for malpractice, the privilege will survive.
'57 Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086.
", Brief for the United States at 21, SwidLer (No. 97-1192) (citing Cohen v. Jenkin-
town Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 692-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)).
"' Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 694 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) ("[T]he
trial court should resolve all doubt in favor of nondisclosure, so that a client should
not be chagrined to learn that the confidences that he conveyed to his attorney have
been revealed to his detriment.").
'6 Id. at 692.
,61 Id. at 693. The Cohen court's analysis of perjury makes the Independent Coun-
sel's citation to the case appear somewhat ironic in light of subsequent events. See
generallyJill Abramson &Jeff Gerth, Perjury is the Foundation of 5 of 11 Grounds Cited for
Impeachment by Starr's Report, N.Y. TIMS, Sept. 13, 1998 at A30.
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posthumous reputations; a contention the Swidler Court cor-
rectly rejects.12 Given the importance of client interest in de-
termining the boundaries of the privilege, as well as the all-too-
apparent weakness in the reasoning of the Independent Coun-
sel's lead case, the Supreme Court was correct to refuse to rec-
ognize an additional exception to the posthumous attorney-
client privilege.
B. PROTECTION OF DEFENDANTS' SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS
JUSTIFICATION FOR SUSPENSION OF THE POSTHUMOUS ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE
In addition to strengthening the posthumous attorney-client
privilege against claims that it should be suspended for reasons
other than clients' best interests, the decision in Swidler was sig-
nificant for its refusal to reach the issue of survival of the post-
humous attorney-client privilege in circumstances implicating
criminal defendants' constitutional right to present exculpatory
evidence. 3 The Court avoided considering what may be the
strongest argument for suspending the posthumous attorney-
client privilege: criminal defendants' right to present evidence
which would exonerate them 1r4 The Court's refusal to hold that
defendants' right to present exculpatory evidence must yield to
the posthumous attorney-client privilege provided hope for
those who contend that clients' posthumous reputational con-
cems should not prevent presentation of evidence which would
exonerate defendants." While the Court's third footnotess
makes it possible that the Court might recognize an exception
to the posthumous privilege to allow the presentation of excul-
162 Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2086.
" 1d. at 2087 n.3.
'64 See Brian R. Hood, The Attorey-Client Privilege and a Revised Rule 1.6: Permitting
Limited Disclosure after the Death of the Client, 7 GEo.J. LEGAL ETmIcs 741 (1994) (arguing
for a revision in American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
permit disclosure of a deceased client's communications when they might exonerate
an innocent defendant). See also Julia Thomas-Fishburn, Attorney-Client Confidences:
Punishing the Innocent, 61 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 185 (1990).
63 See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Colnpulsoy Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 161
(1974) ("No interest protected by a privilege is sufficiently important to outweigh the
defendant's right to establish his innocence through the presentation of clearly ex-
culpatory evidence.").
'66 Swidler, 118 S. Ct. at 2087 n.3.
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patory evidence, such a ruling is improbable as it would be in-
consistent with courts' previous decisions regarding the rela-
tionship between evidentiary privileges and defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights.
Historically, the rights protected by the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment 167 have not received as much at-
tention as those guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.'6 The
Supreme Court has held that the Compulsory Process Clause
was intended to ensure that "criminal defendants have the right
to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of
favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before ajury evi-
dence that might influence the determination of guilt."16
Previous Supreme Court decisions make it unlikely that the
Court will recognize an exception to the posthumous privilege
to allow the presentation of exculpatory evidence. Although the
Supreme Court has struck down evidentiary rules which infringe
on a defendant's right to compulsory process, it has hesitated to
suspend recognized privileges on similar groundsY. In 1967,
the Court decided Washington v. Texas, in which a petitioner
convicted of murder challenged a state rule which prevented
accomplices or coindictees from testifying for one another.17' If
allowed to testify, the man's accomplice would have claimed
sole responsibility for the crime. 72 In striking down the eviden-
tiary rule, the Court held that it violated the defendant's right to
compulsory process because it denied him the opportunity to
present a witness who was capable of testifying to events which
were material or relevant to the petitioner's defense.'73 While
,6T U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra note 147 for the text of the Sixth Amendment.
' The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no one shall be
"deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. ." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 55 (1987) ("This Court has had lit-
tle occasion to discuss the contours of the Compulsory Process Clause.").
' Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39, 56 (1987)).
,70 See id. at 410 ("The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony
that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of
evidence.").
'7 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
17 Id at 16.
1 Id. at 14.
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similar reasoning might be asserted for allowing the testimony
of attorneys for the deceased, the Court sought to foreclose this
type of argument by noting that its analysis should not be ex-
tended to consideration of the attorney-client privilege.7 4 The
Court explained that the protection afforded privileged com-
munications was based on "entirely different considerations"
from those underlying Texas' attempt to disqualify evidence in
Washington.
75
In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court struck down a
lower court's decision to exclude testimony on grounds of hear-
say, since the proffered testimony "bore persuasive assurance of
trustworthiness."7 6 The petitioner sought to overturn a convic-
tion of murder by presenting evidence that a third party had
orally confessed to the crime. 77 The Supreme Court held that
the testimony should be allowed, noting that when "constitu-
tional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are im-
plicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanically to
defeat the ends of justice."'78 The Court's willingness to admit
hearsay evidence to exculpate a defendant appears particularly
significant given its observation that "no rule of evidence has
been more respected or more frequently applied in jury trials
than that applicable to the exclusion of hearsay."' However,
any attempt to construe Chambers as advocating suspension of
the attorney-client privilege in similar circumstances encounters
two main obstacles. First, the Court in Chambers noted that the
exercise of the right to compulsory process must be limited by
"established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and
innocence."80 Established rules of procedure and evidence
would presumably include the well-recognized attorney-client
' Id at 23 n.21 ("nothing in this opinion should be construed as disapproving tes-
timonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination or the lawyer-client
or husband-wife privileges.").
175 I&
'76 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1972).
77 Id at 284.





privilege. Second, any attempt to use the decision in Chambers
to justify suspension of the attorney-client privilege is further
frustrated by the Tenth Circuit's finding in Valdez v. Winans,
that "Chambers does not support the notion that the right to
compulsory process overrides the attorney-client privilege."'8 '
The Valdez court correctly noted that the hearsay rule and the
attorney-client privilege serve two entirely different purposes.8 2
While the hearsay rule acts to exclude potentially unreliable
evidence, privileges are intended to promote extrajudicial in-
terests which are held to outweigh the unfettered search for
truth.
183
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided Rock v. Arkansas, hold-
ing that Arkansas' rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony violated criminal defendants' right to present relevant
evidence.'8 The petitioner sought to have her conviction for
manslaughter overturned because she was denied the opportu-
nity to testify about events which she only remembered after
having her memory refreshed through hypnosis."" The Court
held that when drafting an evidentiary rule, states had to evalu-
ate whether the interests protected by the evidentiary rule justi-
fied limiting defendants' constitutional right to testify under the
Compulsory Process Clause.'8 6 The decision appears to support
use of a balancing test, noting that "restrictions on a defen-
dant's right to testify may not be arbitrary and disproportionate
to the purposes they are designed to serve.' 8 7 However, the sig-
nificance of this decision to questions of attorney-client privi-
lege and the right to compulsory process is limited by the
Court's reference to its earlier footnote in Washington, stating
that the holding should not be interpreted as affecting testimo-
nial privileges."8
18Valdez v. Winans, 738 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1984).
192 Id.
"' Id. (quoting Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 161
(1974)).
184 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987).
15 IM at 47.
Id. at 56.
117 Id, at 55-56.
'" Id. at 55-56 n.11 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967)).
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The most recent Supreme Court opinion construing defen-
dants' Sixth Amendment rights is U.S. v. Scheffer. 9 In Scheffer,
the Court sustained a rule preventing presentation of polygraph
evidence in court martial proceedings against a challenge that it
violated a defendant's right to present a defense.' 9 The peti-
tioner sought to present the results of a polygraph test which
indicated that he had not lied about his alleged use of drugs1 9'
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court noted that exclu-
sionary rules do not violate a defendant's right to present a de-
fense, unless they "are arbitrary and disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve." 92 The Court further ex-
plained that rules are arbitrary or disproportionate to the extent
that they threaten an important interest of the accused.93 In
seeking to distinguish the facts in Scheffer from those in Washing-
ton,'- Chambers,95 and Rock196 the Court noted that the exclusions
of evidence found unconstitutional in those cases "significantly
undermined fundamental elements of the accused's defense.'
97
Scheffer's holding is significant because it clarifies the type of
rules the Court considers arbitrary and disproportionate. Ap-
plying this understanding, the exclusion of exculpatory evi-
dence, particularly one's confession to a crime for which
another is being prosecuted, would appear to significantly un-
dermine a "fundamental element of the accused's defense."
However, the holding in Scheffer does not extend to the tension
between defendants' right to compulsory process and the attor-
ney-client privilege since the case addresses an evidentiary rule,
rather than a privilege.
"9 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998).
,9oId at 1268-69.
" Id. at 1262.92 Id at 1265.
193 Id
'9 Washington v. Davis, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See supra notes 171-75 and accompany-
ing text.
" Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1972). See supra notes 176-83 and ac-
companying text.
'9 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying
text.
'97 Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1267-68.
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Existing lower court decisions further reduce the likelihood
that the Supreme Court will recognize an exception to the
posthumous privilege to allow the presentation of exculpatory
evidence. Two circuit courts have already ruled on the question
of whether defendants' Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process justifies suspending the privilege when clients are still
alive. 198 Both courts held that the right to compulsory process
must yield when the attorney-client privilege is asserted.
In Myers v. Fye, the petitioner had been convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to death.19 During his trial, he sought to
prove insanity by presenting letters he had written to his teen-
age accomplice. 200 At the time, the letters were being held by
the accomplice's attorney, who withheld them on a claim of
privilege.201 The court held that the attorney's refusal to pro-
duce the letters did not violate the defendant's right to compul-
sory process, noting that the right is violated only when "broad
arbitrary rules" exclude whole categories of witness testimony
on the ground that it is "unworthy of belief.",0 2 The Court's
finding that assertion of the privilege was neither broad nor ar-
bitrary frustrates future compulsory process claims aimed at as-
sertions of attorney-client privilege.
In Valdez v. Winans, the petitioner sought to introduce evi-
dence that another prisoner had confessed to the crime for
which the petitioner had been convicted.2 3 The case was a par-
ticularly interesting one since the prisoner had confessed to the
petitioner's public defender, and then subsequently recanted
his confession.2 04 The court refused to admit testimony of the
confession, finding that it was protected by the attorney-client
privilege. 2" The court based its decision on the fact that the
prisoner was being represented by another public defender
," SeeValdez v. Winans, 738 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1984); Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18
(7th Cir. 1968).
'" 401 F.2d at 19.
"0 Id. at 20.
201 Id
Id. at 21.




from the same office as petitioner's counsel.Y Though the evi-
dence the defendant sought to present might have exculpated
him, the court refused to admit it, noting that "the Sixth
Amendment usually has been forced to yield when a testimonial
privilege is asserted."2 °7 The holding in this case is particularly
forceful since the excluded evidence bore directly on the de-
fendant's guilt.
Three state courts have already considered whether defen-
dants' Sixth Amendment rights justify suspending the attorney-
client privilege after a client's death.0 8 All three courts sus-
tained the posthumous privilege against challenges based on
the Sixth Amendment.
In Arizona v. Macumber, a client's need for exculpatory evi-
dence directly conflicted with the posthumous attorney-client
privilege.2 0 The defendant sought to introduce the testimony of
two attorneys that their deceased client had confessed to the
crime for which the defendant had been charged.210 The ruling
was a significant one since the evidence sought to be presented
was clearly relevant to the question of petitioner's guilt. The
court reasoned that since the privilege was statutory in Arizona,
the legislature's failure to provide for an express exception
meant there was none available for presentation of exculpatory
evidence.2 1' Though the value of this decision as precedent may
be weakened by the court's reliance on Arizona statutory law,
the decision is representative of courts' unwillingness to sus-
pend the posthumous attorney-client privilege.
In Cooper v. State, the petitioner had been convicted of mur-
der even though one of the state's key witnesses had died before
the trial. The deceased witness' prior testimony was read at
trial, and the defendant appealed when he was denied the op-
portunity to question the deceased witness' attorney concerning
206.id.'207 &d
Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976); People v. Pena, 198 Cal. Rptr.
819 (Cal. CL App. 1984); Cooper v. State, 661 P.2d 905 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
20 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
210 Id. at 1086.
211 Id.
212 Cooper v. State, 661 P. 2d 906, 907 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
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the written testimony.2 13 The defendant argued that his right to
confront a witness under the Sixth Amendment justified sus-
pending the deceased witness' attorney-client privilege. 4 The
court rejected this argument, finding that the right to confront
a witness did not include the right to examine that witness' at-
21torney. 15 The court held that "the right to compulsory process
does not negate traditional privileges such as the attorney-client
privilege. 216
In People v. Pena, the petitioner had been convicted of mur-
der, and argued that he had been wrongfully denied the oppor-
tunity to question the victim's attorney.1 7 The petitioner hoped
to strengthen his claim of self defense by presenting testimony
of a privileged conversation regarding the victim's earlier in-
dictment for assault with a deadly weapon.2 '8 The court found
that the defendant had no right to compel the testimony of the
victim's attorney.219 However, the significance of this decision is
tempered by the fact that the evidence the defendant sought to
compel was deemed irrelevant by the court. While explicitly
rejecting the claim that defendants' Sixth Amendment rights
justify suspending the posthumous attorney-client privilege, the
decisions in Cooper and Pena serve as weak precedent to the ex-
tent that their holdings address instances where evidence bore
minimal significance to defendants' innocence.
A cursory examination of the Supreme Court's evolving
Compulsory Process Clause jurisprudence might give hope to
those who believe that the posthumous attorney-client privilege
should be suspended to allow presentation of exculpatory evi-
dence. However, the Court's previous reluctance to apply its
Compulsory Process Clause analysis to well-established privileges
makes it unlikely that the Court will recognize an additional ex-





217 People v. Pena, 198 Cal. Rptr. 819, 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
2as Id. at 828-29.
219 Id.
2o Id. at 829.
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view of lower court rulings concerning the relationship between
the attorney-client privilege and the Sixth Amendment makes it
appear even less likely that the Court will make such a finding.
Furthermore, allowing the privilege to be suspended for presen-
tation of exculpatory evidence would be inconsistent with the
Court's guiding principle in construing the privilege: safeguard-
ing clients' best interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the Supreme Court sent a
clear message that the contours of the posthumous attorney-
client privilege were not to be determined by balancing clients'
interests in confidentiality against other judicial policy goals.
The decision reaffirmed clients' best interests as the guiding
principle when preservation of the attorney-client privilege is
questioned. However, in failing to address cases implicating de-
fendants' constitutional rights, the Court left open the question
whether defendants' right to present exculpatory evidence un-
der the Compulsory Process Clause warrants suspension of the
posthumous privilege. However, the Swidler Court's emphasis
on client interests in construing the privilege, as well as previous
courts' unwillingness to limit common law privileges when con-
fronted with Compulsory Process Clause challenges, makes it
unlikely that the Supreme Court will recognize an additional
exception to the posthumous attorney-client privilege for ex-
culpatory evidence.
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